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United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807
(2016).
Jonah Brown
When landowners seek to determine if a permit is required from
the Army Corps of Engineers to discharge dredged or fill material into
waters within their property boundaries, they may first obtain a
jurisdictional determination specifying whether “waters of the United
States” are present. In an 8-0 judgment, Army Corps of Engineers v.
Hawkes was a victory for landowners, concluding that an approved
jurisdictional determination is a final agency action reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Determining whether “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”)
are present on private property can be a challenging process.1 Because of
this difficulty, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) allows a property
owner to obtain a preliminary or approved “jurisdictional determination”
(“JD”) that specifies whether their property contains such waters.2 United
States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes concerned an approved JD
concluding that land owned by peat mining companies (“Respondents”)
contained WOTUS because of its nexus to the Red River.3 Respondents
argued that an approved JD was reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). The Corps argued that an approved JD is not
reviewable because it is not a final agency action. Further, the Corps
argued that Respondents have the option to proceed without a permit and
assert that one is not required, or complete the permit process and then
seek judicial review.4 The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota dismissed the action in favor of the Corps, holding that a JD is
not a final agency action.5 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that an
approved JD is reviewable and parties do not need to await enforcement
proceedings before they challenge the final agency action.6 By applying
the two part test used in Bennett v. Spear to determine the finality of an
agency action, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that an approved JD is conclusory and affirmed the Eighth Circuit
ruling.7
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Obtaining a permit to discharge fill material into wetlands can be
a challenging and expensive process that may take years.8 A landowner
seeking to discharge such material into waters within their land may
obtain a JD to ensure compliance with the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”)
section 404 permitting requirement.9 There are substantial criminal and
civil penalties associated with discharge into such waters without a
permit, but obtaining a permit is extremely costly.10 One study shows
that the average applicant spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing
the process.11 Further, “general” permits may take applicants over 300
days to complete.12
Though it is not an express requirement, the Corps may issue a
JD stating whether or not the property contains WOTUS when a
landowner wishes to discharge fill material into such waters.13 The Corps
defines WOTUS to include “mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, [and] playa lakes[.]”14 The application of
this definition to wetlands throughout the United States has allowed the
Corps to regulate over 270-to-300 million acres of lands in the United
States – including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the
lower 48 States.15
JDs may come in two different varieties: preliminary or
approved. A preliminary JD is issued when the Corps has determined
that there may be waters of the United States within the property. An
approved JD, on the other hand, states with finality whether or not such
waters are present.16 If an approved JD is issued specifying that there are
no WOTUS, a landowner may discharge without a permit and will not
risk CWA violations. However, if the JD identifies the land as containing
WOTUS, then the landowner must pursue a permit in order to avoid
penalties.17
The land at issue in this case involved a 530-acre tract that
included wetlands owned by Respondents in Minnesota.18 Respondents
operated peat mining companies near the tract in question and desired to
expand their operation, believing that the tract contained high-quality
peat.19 Peat is an organic material that can be burned as fuel or provide
8
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structural support for golf course greens.20 Peat is found in waterlogged
grounds such as wetlands and, in spite of its wide usage, peat mining can
have significant environmental impacts.21
Respondents applied for a permit from the Corps in December
2010, seeking authorization to discharge material into the waters within
their property.22 As a preliminary measure to the permitting process, the
Corps issued an approved JD that specified the wetlands in question were
WOTUS because they had a “significant nexus” to the Red River, some
120 miles away.23 Respondents first appealed this JD, which was
remanded. On remand, the Corps reaffirmed its decision and issued a
revised JD furthering its conclusion.24
Respondents sought judicial review of the JD under the APA.25
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that
the JD was not a “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in court,” and thus dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.26 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision, concluding that an approved JD is a final agency
action, and was therefore reviewable under the APA.27
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court examined the issue of whether a JD is a final
agency action that may be reviewed under the APA.28 The court looked
to the test in Bennett to determine whether the agency action was final.29
Bennett established a two-part test that generally must be satisfied to
constitute a final action under the APA: “First, the action must mark the
consummation of the agency’s decision making process … And second,
the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”30
When the Court applied the Bennett test, it found that a
preliminary JD would not be a consummation of an agency’s decision
making process because it is merely an indeterminate conclusion.31 In
contrast, the court found that an approved JD was the consummation of
the Corps’ evaluation because it “definitively” determines that certain
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property contains jurisdictional waters.32 Further, the Corps did not
dispute that the first prong of the Bennett test was satisfied when an
approved JD was issued.33
Turning then to the second prong of the test, the Court found that
since there was a definitive nature associated with approved JDs, there
were legal consequences that flowed from them.34 Both positive and
negative JDs have consequences because of a negative JDs potential to
limit liability landowners may face, as they will not be subject to
enforcement proceedings under the CWA for discharge into the
corresponding wetlands during the established time period.35 Further, the
Corps and the EPA share a memorandum of agreement that binds the two
agencies to a five-year safe harbor from CWA enforcement proceedings
if a negative JD is issued.36 A positive JD has legal consequences as well
because it is a denial of protection from enforcement proceedings if the
landowner is to discharge into those waters, and a violation may subject
the owner to criminal and civil penalties if they fail to obtain a permit.37
Regardless of whether or not an agency action is final, there
must be no adequate alternatives to the APA in order for the action to be
reviewable.38 Consequently, the Corps asserted that Respondents had two
viable alternatives: discharging fill material without a permit with the
assumption that the land does not require a permit, or apply for a permit
and then seek review if the result is unsatisfactory.39
Having determined that an approved JD was final, the Court
found that neither one of the alternatives presented were an adequate
remedy. If a party was to discharge without a permit, with the mistaken
belief that they did not require such a permit, they would face penalties
of up to $37,000 for every day that the CWA was violated.40 It has also
been well settled that parties do not need to wait for enforcement
proceedings before they challenge a final agency action when they are at
risk of criminal and civil penalties.41 The Court thus concluded that the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed.42
IV. CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS
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Id. at 1813-1814.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Army Corps of Engineers v.
Hawkes may be fairly regarded as a victory in favor of private property
rights and landowners that seek assurance with regard to their CWA
compliance. Landowners hoping to obtain a determination of whether
their property contains WOTUS are now provided with, what the Court
unanimously believes to be, procedural due process under the CWA.
Those dissatisfied with an approved JD may now immediately litigate in
federal court rather than having to bear the risk of discharging without a
permit, or waiting until the arduous permitting process is complete.
Further, this decision is a victory in favor of those in opposition
to the broad reaches of the CWA. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Anthony Kennedy opined that “the reach and systemic consequences of
the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern.” Justice Kennedy then
followed by extending Justice Alito’s description of the CWA as
“notoriously unclear.”43 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, in which Justices
Thomas and Alito joined, presents doubts with regard to the
constitutionality of the CWA and its implications on landowners use and
enjoyment of their land. Thus, it is unclear whether this case will serve as
a basis for a narrower interpretation of the CWA. Directly, however, the
decision will likely result in a more predictable and less expensive
process for landowners, as they are no longer required to complete the
whole permitting process only to have their permit denied.
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